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Abstract
Many of the most pressing issues in information ethics—informational 
privacy, surveillance, intellectual property, access to information, and 
the distribution of information resources—can only be addressed 
at the level of global politics. This paper develops an approach to 
theorizing about political questions of concern to information ethics. 
It begins by situating a political philosophy of information within the 
broader field of ethics and defending a theoretical approach that is 
practical, person-centered, and pluralistic. The method of dialogic 
public reason, as articulated by John Rawls and supplemented with 
insights from Jürgen Habermas, is described and defended. It is 
argued that dialogic public reason provides a way to justify political 
principles in a diverse global context. The paper concludes by relat-
ing the idea of dialogic public reason to international human rights. 
The putative human right to intellectual property is criticized on the 
grounds that it does not pass the test of public reason. 
Introduction
Information ethics is the study of normative questions related to the cre-
ation, preservation, organization, access, presentation, and control of in-
formation; it addresses such concerns as “equity of access to information, 
intellectual freedom, information privacy and confidentiality, and intellec-
tual property” (Furner, 2010, p. 191). Many of the most pressing issues in 
information ethics are questions of political philosophy. Political philosophy 
has been defined as “philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our 
collective life—our political institutions and our social practices” (Miller, 
1998).1 These include the proper extent of state control and regulation 
of the internet, the proper limits on the power of the state to gather in-
formation about citizens and foreign nationals, and the scope and limits 
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of international intellectual property agreements. However, few theorists 
working in information ethics explicitly draw on contemporary work in 
political philosophy.2 This paper seeks to begin a greater engagement of 
information ethicists with the questions of political philosophy and the 
work of political philosophers. The central claim of the paper is that a 
political philosophy of information should work within the framework of 
Public Reason, a pluralistic approach to political justification developed 
by John Rawls and others (Quong, 2013). 
The paper begins with a brief introduction to the field of information 
ethics, situating it within ethics more broadly. After a brief discussion of 
the sorts of questions that a political philosophy of information would 
address, I turn to the question of theory choice within ethics. Section 2 
briefly surveys a number of ethical theories and argues for a pluralistic 
approach to ethical theorizing. Section 3 asks how we can develop and 
justify political principles that apply internationally and cross-culturally. 
To answer this question, I introduce two key ideas developed by Rawls 
in his work on political liberalism—“overlapping consensus” and “public 
reason.” While Rawls’s theory provides many insights on how agreement 
on ethical principles can be achieved among people with differing value 
systems, some of the strictures that he puts on the use of public reason 
are unnecessary and counterproductive. To solve this problem, I suggest 
that we look to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics. Combining 
Rawls’s work on overlapping consensus and public reason with Haber-
mas’s discourse leads to a genuinely dialogic conception of public reason. 
I conclude the section with some reflections on the central role of access 
to information to the project of dialogic public reason. Section 4 turns to 
questions of global politics and suggests that human rights can serve as a 
set of shared principles for a global public reason. To illustrate how public 
reason might be used to justify or evaluate principles of informational 
justice, I briefly discuss the justifiability of the human right to intellectual 
property and argue that as it currently stands, the public justifications of a 
human right to intellectual property do not pass the test of global public 
reason.
Ethics: Mapping the Domain
Library and information science (LIS), as its names implies, is a disci-
pline largely focused on the testing of theories, discovery of facts, and 
development of systems and services. Given this, work on ethics, which 
focuses on normative questions of value, may need some introduction. 
This section provides a characterization of ethical inquiry and a map of 
the field of ethics, while pointing out a number of theoretical choices that 
I will be making in this paper. In this section, I try to make clear that any 
ethicist must make a number of theoretical choices, and note where other 
information ethicists may make different choices. The section concludes 
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with a closer look at questions of political philosophy within information 
ethics.
Aristotle said that we are rational animals. Whether or not that is true, it 
is most certainly true that we are judging animals. We judge circumstances 
and we judge our own and other people’s behavior, appearance, language, 
and beliefs. Implicit in many such judgments is an idea of how things not 
just could, but should or ought to be. These judgments come in different 
flavors: there are practical judgments, aesthetic judgments, and moral 
judgments. A single statement can express a variety of possible judgments. 
For example, if someone says, “You shouldn’t wear such a tight dress,” this 
may express a practical judgment (for example, “You plan to play tennis 
in it and you don’t want something that will restrict your movement”), an 
aesthetic judgment (“It isn’t flattering”), or a moral judgment (“Women 
should show modesty”). Ethical/moral theory, also called simply ethics, is 
the study of that subclass of judgments and rules we call moral judgments.3 
The moral philosopher does not study these judgments from the out-
side as linguistic, psychological, or sociological phenomena; instead, the 
moral philosopher takes part in the activity of making moral judgments—
she reflects critically on accepted judgments, unearths unstated assump-
tions behind moral judgments, subjects such assumptions to critical scru-
tiny, and provides arguments in support of particular moral judgments 
or systems of moral rules. In order to do this, moral philosophers often 
need to begin by clarifying our core moral concepts. Starting with basic 
ethical questions—for example, What should I/we be or do?—the moral 
philosopher considers further questions. Take, for instance, the moral 
principle that we should not take what does not belong to us. When does 
a thing “belong” to someone? Do people have a right to their property? 
What is a “right”? Without answers to such questions, it is unclear what the 
principle is telling us to do, or why we ought to do it. Thus, much ethi-
cal reflection requires the clarification of basic concepts like “property,” 
“right,” “happiness,” “virtue,” and so on. 
Practical ethics asks how theories or principles apply to particular ques-
tions within a particular domain, such as, What does privacy mean in the 
context of social media? or Is unauthorized copying equivalent to steal-
ing? The study of practical ethics can be classified in terms of its domain 
or subject matter. To note just three domains: there is medical or bio-ethics, 
which focuses on ethical questions that arise in the context of medical 
care, such as how to fairly allocate scarce donated organs. There is business 
ethics, which focuses on ethical questions that arise in business transac-
tions, such as who should be held accountable when a corporation causes 
harm. And there is information ethics, the subject of this paper, which fo-
cuses on ethical questions related to information creation, storage, or-
ganization, access, and control. There are, of course, many more areas 
of practical ethics (for example, engineering ethics, legal ethics, military 
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ethics, and so on), and there are questions that concern more than one 
domain. For, example, the issue of user privacy related to commercially 
available mobile applications for monitoring health (for example, food 
intake, exercise, pulse rate, glucose level) is at the intersection of informa-
tion ethics, business ethics, and bio-ethics (fig. 1).
Currently, there are two major approaches to information ethics. 
The first, taken by information ethicists like Ess (2006), Moore (2010), 
Nissenbaum (2004), and Zimmer (2013), focuses primarily on human be-
ings as the object of moral concern. The second, most notably advocated 
by Luciano Floridi (2002, 2008a, 2008b), focuses on information itself as 
the object of moral concern—with human beings being a special case of 
information objects (fig. 2). In order to clarify this division, it may be 
helpful to introduce the concepts of a moral agent and moral patient, 
which I do below. 
A moral agent is an entity whose characters and action are appropriately 
the focus of moral evaluation or judgment. Most theories limit the cat-
egory of moral agent to human beings. Since human beings are (at least 
somewhat) rational beings who make moral judgments and act on them, 
they can be evaluated from a moral point of view. We may judge that a 
person’s action is kind or cruel, fair or unfair, in so doing holding them 
as “responsible” for their action.4 A moral patient is an entity that is ap-
propriately the focus of moral concern, but not judgment. Moral patients 
are entities that should be considered when making moral decisions, the 
harming of which is prima facie wrong. While in general ethical theorists 
agree that human beings are moral patients, what else may be consid-
ered a moral patient, and the proper degree of moral concern for such 
patients, is still a matter of debate. Some theorists include animals or the 
natural world more generally as moral patients, arguing that these entities 
ought to be given significant moral weight in their own right. Within the 
field of information ethics, Floridi (2008a) has proposed an information-
based theory of the good, which extends the circle of moral patients to 
include all things that exist, considered informationally.
Without being committed to the view that only human beings are moral 
patients, the theory proposed here starts with the idea that human beings 
are a unique kind of moral patient, and that reflecting on what human be-
ings owe to one another, setting aside other moral patients, is a useful way 
to divide the ethical labor. This in no way commits us to the view that the 
interests of human beings trump those of other beings; ultimately, ethical 
reflection should include what we owe to other beings. But for the most 
part, questions of information ethics are questions about how we should 
treat one another—how we should share, protect, and use information in 
ways that benefits (or at least does not harm) other human beings. 
Ethical inquiry may focus on what we ought to do as morally responsible, 
individual human beings—what we might call personal ethics. Questions 
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of personal ethics related to information may include: How wrong is it for 
me to download pirated music? Should we covertly monitor our child’s 
Facebook account? Should I donate money to Wikipedia? At a wider 
scope are ethical questions that apply to a smaller group within the wider 
society, such as those with particular roles in society. One kind of group 
ethics is professional ethics—or more broadly, role-based ethics. Professional 
or role-based ethics starts from the fact that people take on various roles 
or functions within society. In so doing, persons individually and collec-
tively take on particular responsibilities and obligations (as well as pow-
ers) that they do not have purely as individuals. Issues of professional or 
role-based ethics may include such questions as: Is it ever appropriate for 
an information provider to censor content? If so, when? Should the li-
brary charge fees? How should ICT professionals balance protecting user 
privacy and access versus cooperating with regional governments and 
laws? At the largest scale, ethical inquiry may focus on what we ought to 
Figure 1. The three domains of practical ethics.
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do as a society—locally, nationally, and internationally. This is the focus of 
political philosophy (fig. 3).5
Questions in Political Philosophy of Information
As noted in the introduction, political philosophy has been defined as 
“philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life—our 
political institutions and our social practices” (Miller, 1998). There are a 
number of different sorts of “bests” that we might be concerned with—
efficiency, beauty, order, or wealth. Political philosophy is part of ethics; 
thus, it concerns how best to arrange our collective life in terms of moral 
values like equality, freedom, fairness, community, happiness, flourishing, 
and excellence. Political philosophy can be traced back to the beginnings 
of both Western and Eastern philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, and Confucius 
were all concerned with the best form of political organization. 
To illustrate the range of political philosophy, consider the following 
general questions in political philosophy and how they relate to questions 
in information ethics: 
•	 Do	individuals	have	an	obligation	to	obey	the	laws	of	their	state?	What	
are the limits of politically motivated disobedience? For example, is it 
Figure 2. The scope of moral concern.
 political philosophy of information/mathiesen 433
morally permissible to leak classified information to a news source or 
Wikileaks? 
•	 What	(if	any)	are	the	limits	of	the	authority	of	the	state?	For	example,	
to what extent (if at all) is the state obligated to respect the privacy or 
free speech rights of individual members? 
•	 Are	there	topics	on	which	the	state	must	be	neutral?	For	example,	should	
public libraries exclude certain kinds of content on the grounds that it 
promotes values that the state rejects (for example, racism, terrorism)? 
•	 Can	promoting	liberty	by	itself	stop	oppression?	Or	may	the	liberty	of	
some individuals need to be curtailed in order to create greater equal-
ity and opportunity? For example, is it sufficient that oppressed groups 
are given equal liberty to express their views, or should some forms of 
speech and expression (for example, hate speech, pornography) be lim-
ited in order to create the necessary conditions for genuine equality? 
Figure 3. The scale of ethical inquiry.
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•	 Is	it	ever	acceptable	to	limit	individual	liberty	in	order	to	promote	greater	
community harmony, cohesion, or security? For example, is it permissible 
for governments to restrict speech that undermines social harmony or 
security?
Until as recently as thirty years ago, it was assumed that questions of 
equality, democratic representation, and rights were matters of relations 
among citizens and the government of a single state. Discussions of just 
relations among people in different states were limited to just war theory 
and, perhaps, questions about obligations to the global poor. Recently, 
there has been an emergence of a greater concern with global or interna-
tional justice and human rights. In short, the “collective life” has expand-
ed from the populace of the nation-state to the whole of humanity. And, 
in our expanding global-information society, these political questions re-
lated to “global information ethics” (Carbo & Smith, 2008a; Zaïane, 2011) 
are particularly pressing.6 Thus, there are a large number of questions in 
information ethics that are questions of international political philosophy: 
•	 What	are	the	limits	(if	any)	of	pursuing	the	national	interest?	Do	states	
have obligations to one another or to individuals in other states? What 
is the source of such obligations? For instance, do Americans have some 
obligation to see to it that those in other countries have access to essential 
information? 
•	 Under	what	 circumstances	 is	one	 state	 justified	 in	going	 to	war	with	
another? For example, are states justified in engaging in information 
warfare? If so, under what conditions? 
•	 What	obligations	does	one	state	have	to	respect	the	rights	of	those	in	
other states? For instance, what obligations does the US government 
have to respect the informational privacy of those in another state? 
•	 What	is	required	for	international	institutions	and	agreements	to	be	
legitimate? For instance, are current intellectual property regimes fair 
to developing nations?
Theoretical Frameworks
In addition to choosing what domain, scope, and scale will be the focus 
on an ethical inquiry, the ethical theorist must also choose a theoretical 
framework. It is common to divide ethical theories into consequentialist 
and nonconsequentialist frameworks. Consequentialist theories focus on the 
consequences or outcomes of an action or policy. If the consequences of 
the action or policy are good overall, then it is the morally right choice. 
Consequentialists differ among themselves on what counts as a “good 
consequence.” The most common form of consequentialism is utilitarian-
ism, which views general happiness or preference satisfaction as the good 
consequence to be sought. Nonconsequentialists hold that we should not 
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use consequences as our (only) guide to whether an action or policy is 
morally correct; there are other moral considerations grounded in moral 
rules, virtues, or relationships. Nonconsequentialist theories include Kant’s 
deontological ethics, Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and the feminist ethic of 
care.7 Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories, however, 
are what we can call monist theories; monists hold that we should use a 
single moral framework when making any ethical decision. 
Unlike monist approaches, pluralist approaches, such as particularism, 
casuistry, and principlism, avoid the commitment to a single unique ethi-
cal theory or conception of value. Particularism eschews moral theorizing 
altogether, arguing that moral problems must be solved on a case-by-case 
basis. Casuistry also focuses on cases, but adopts analogical reasoning to 
determine how previous cases may provide guidance for resolving new 
cases. The principlist articulates and defends “mid-level principles,” such 
as “respect autonomy”; principlists give pluralistic arguments for such 
principles, showing how they may be supported by various forms of ethi-
cal reasoning—including both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 
reasons (fig. 4).
As an approach to political theorizing, principlism has virtues over both 
monist and other pluralist approaches. First, principlism does not rely 
upon a single moral theory, but incorporates a number of moral consid-
erations, including concerns for consequences, virtue, and specific duties, 
such as respect. Thus, it does not require that all people accept a single 
ethical theory in order for them to accept a basic ethical principle. Sec-
ond, principlism, as its name suggests, provides principles that can serve 
as a shared basis for discussions of public-policy decisions. These prin-
ciples are designed to be clear and applicable to a wide range of circum-
stances, so consequently are well-suited for handling issues in practical 
ethics. Indeed, it is not surprising that principlism is the most widely used 
approach in bio-ethics, which is the most developed area of practical eth-
ics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
Political theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls have suggested that 
our common life ought to be governed by a few principles—often formu-
lated as basic rights. Indeed, rights theories have various similarities with 
principlist approaches insofar as 1) the rights that one must respect are 
plural, and each of these rights must be exercised in the light of the oth-
ers; and 2) rights can be justified via a number of different, more basic 
ethical theories, including: a theory of natural rights (Locke, 1690/1988), 
utilitarianism (Mill, 1861/1985), capabilities theories (Nussbaum, 2000), 
and pragmatism (Beitz, 2009). In section 4, I suggest that we think of hu-
man rights as normative principles to guide policy-making. First, however, 
it is important to consider how we can justify any set of political prin-
ciples—be they human rights or other principles. 
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Justifying Principles in a Political Philosophy  
of Information
Political philosophy’s focus on the ethical conduct of our collective life has 
important implications for how political principles ought to be justified. 
Since the question is how our collective life should be arranged, the justi-
fication must be one that is addressed to us. It is not sufficient that I have 
good reasons to accept a particular political principle; reasons to accept 
the principle must be available to everyone within the political commu-
nity. In recognition of this fact, a number of philosophers, most notably 
Rawls, have developed an account of “public reason.” Public reason “re-
quires that the moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, 
in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the 
rules purport to have authority” (Quong, 2013). Public reason is both a 
set of reasons that can be shared by the public (as opposed to private rea-
sons) and an attitude toward public discussion. 
To better understand what public reasons are, it may help to start with 
an example of justifications that do not count as public reasons in today’s 
multicultural world. Many classic texts of political philosophy are no lon-
ger sources of public reasons. Such works typically start from what Rawls 
calls “a comprehensive conception of the good.” They then derive their 
political principles from that conception. A “conception of the good” is 
a view of the nature of human beings and their place in the world, im-
plying particular metaphysical and moral commitments. Aristotle (1998), 
for example, begins his The Politics with a description of human beings as 
rational animals who have the natural function of living their lives accord-
ing to reason; when they do so, they are “virtuous.” Only when organized 
in a way that promotes virtue can the society and the persons in it func-
tion properly; this can only occur if the society is governed by reason. 
Figure 4. Methods of ethical decision making. 
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This account leads Aristotle to propose “aristocracy”—rule by the most 
virtuous (and thus most rational) persons—as the best form of govern-
ment. Similarly, appealing to religious and political views common among 
his fellow Englishmen, Locke (1690/1988) argued that all persons are by 
nature free and equal. While they are also naturally sociable, according to 
Locke, persons are mildly competitive and will come into conflict if there 
is no recognized authority. Consequently, persons would choose to have 
an authority to enforce laws in order to avoid the costs of such conflicts. 
Thus, in Locke’s view, given individuals’ natural freedom and equality, the 
only justified authority would be one that people freely choose through 
a social contract while retaining certain “natural rights,” such as that to 
property. 
Aristotle and Locke started from different comprehensive conceptions 
of the nature of human beings from which they derived their political the-
ories, and which they used to justify these theories to their communities. 
Shared sets of beliefs about the nature of human beings and their place in 
the world are harder to come by in contemporary pluralistic, multicultur-
al societies. While there may be wide agreement on core beliefs and val-
ues within certain societies, these are much more difficult to locate within 
liberal democracies, such as are found in North America and Europe. 
When it comes to the international community, broadly shared common, 
comprehensive conceptions are even more difficult to find. Globally com-
prehensive conceptions range from atheism to fundamentalist mono- 
theism, from individualism to communitarianism, from cosmopolitan-
ism to ethnic nationalism. In this sense, pluralism is not just a theoretical 
choice, but an empirical fact. Furthermore, as Rawls (1993) points out, 
this pluralism is “reasonable”; it is natural that people who are free to 
adopt or develop their own views will end up with divergent views. While 
some disagreement can be bridged with more information, correcting 
prejudices, or improving communication, some disagreement is simply 
ineliminable. 
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, arguing for political principles 
from premises that rely upon a particular comprehensive conception is a 
nonstarter. This is not just because agreement is unlikely, but because jus-
tifying a principle based on your comprehensive conception fails to show 
understanding of and respect for those persons who do not share your 
conception. Arguing for political principles that are intended to govern 
our collective life on the basis of a particular comprehensive conception 
is like insisting on speaking English to people who speak only Spanish; 
it is disrespectful—it assumes that others should (and, if they were not 
recalcitrant, would) speak your (moral) language. On Rawls’s conception 
of public reason, such arguments fail to be reasonable. To be reasonable 
in this sense is to show the political virtues of tolerance, mutual respect, 
fairness, and civility (p. 122).
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Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can we expect there to be 
any shared public reasons on which to base political principles? How is it 
possible to justify political principles in a way that is reasonable and does 
not start from a particular comprehensive conception? In his work after A 
Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls developed an approach to political philoso-
phy that he hoped could proceed without commitment to a comprehen-
sive conception—a theory that is “political, not metaphysical.” Key to this 
approach is the idea of an “overlapping consensus” (Rawls, 1987). The 
idea of an overlapping consensus is that persons can each have reasons 
for accepting a political principle based on their own deeply held com-
prehensive conception without everyone sharing the same conception. A 
classic example of an overlapping consensus is the shared commitment 
by many religious and nonreligious persons in the United States to the 
principle of the separation of church and state, as expressed in the Bill of 
Rights. Religious persons from a variety of faiths can be fully committed 
to this separation on the grounds that faith is a personal commitment 
that ought not be mandated by the state; nonreligious persons can also 
be committed to this principle on the grounds that they should be free to 
not practice any religion whatsoever. It is important to emphasize that an 
overlapping consensus is not merely a compromise. Rather, each person 
or group of persons is committed to the principle in part because it is sup-
ported by their own comprehensive conception of the good. 
Ideally, while the principles are supported by reasons from within vari-
ous comprehensive conceptions, this is not the only source of persons’ 
commitment to them. The fact that a principle is able to gain an over-
lapping consensus is itself a reason to endorse it. It seems likely that a 
principle that can be supported by a number of different comprehensive 
conceptions may be capturing some central moral concern. More impor-
tantly, however, in seeking for an overlapping consensus, persons show re-
spect for one another. It is as a principle that embodies such respect that 
the object of an overlapping consensus gains an independent source of 
commitment.8 Public cultures that come to share a number of such prin-
ciples develop the resources for a robust form of public reason. We appeal 
to public reasons when in discussions with fellow members of the political 
community (whether the community is a nation-state or the international 
community) we appeal to shared principles, rather than to our own com-
prehensive conceptions.
Rawls’s theory of the overlapping consensus supporting public rea-
son provides an idealized picture of how justification should function in 
a pluralistic society. Unfortunately, it provides little insight into how we 
can get to this ideal state or how public reason may change over time 
because it requires only that preexisting public reasons be appealed to 
in any public political discussion. Habermas’s (1990) theory of discourse 
ethics provides a way to think about the development of public reason as 
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a dynamic and open process. For both Rawls and Habermas, the goal is 
the same—to discover shared interests and values that can be the basis of 
collective self-governance while still allowing for differences in individual 
and group views of nature, human beings, and what constitutes a “good 
life.” However, while Rawls insists that principles of justice and policy 
proposals ought to be justified by appealing to public reason alone, 
Habermas encourages a wide-ranging discussion among the public. This 
discussion would include each person articulating her own perspective, 
including her reasons grounded in her comprehensive conception of the 
good. According to Habermas, it is through a dialogue where people lis-
ten to one another’s perspectives and try to see the world from one an-
other’s point of view that we can discover the common interests where 
our views overlap (Rehg, 1994, pp. 101–103). 
Allowing people to articulate their comprehensive conceptions in pub-
lic discussions of political principles has a number of epistemological and 
moral advantages: 
•	 It	exposes	us	to	the	interests,	perspective,	and	concerns	of	others.
•	 It	helps	us	to	discover	what	our	own	concerns	really	are;	it	is	often	only	
in articulating our concerns and perspectives to others that we truly 
understand them for ourselves. 
•	 It	provides	 a	 check	on	 the	 reasoning	of	 the	 individual;	 persons	may	
have blind spots and inconsistencies of which they are unaware. 
•	 It	creates	 the	context	 for	problem	solving:	 together,	we	may	see	pos-
sibilities for overlapping consensus that we would not have seen alone. 
•	 It	shows	respect	for	others	as	equal	partners	in	a	dialogue.
•	 It	builds	the	basis	for	understanding	and	empathy.
•	 It	creates	the	context	for	genuine	solidarity	as	we	come	to	understand	
(although not always agree with) one another’s perspectives. 
•	 It	provides	a	check	on	whether	there	is	a	genuine	overlapping	consensus	
or merely acquiescence. 
Given these virtues of opening up the realm of public political discus-
sion to arguments based on comprehensive conceptions, I suggest that 
we adopt a robustly dialogic approach to public reasoning. On a dialogic 
public reason we set as our goal developing together an understanding of 
what our shared public reasons can be. 
The dialogic approach also leaves room for individuals and groups to 
develop new understandings in response to societal changes. So, for ex-
ample, the digital revolution has brought with it many new opportuni-
ties and threats to human flourishing. Philosophical and other theorizing 
about the nature of these challenges and possible responses to them (see, 
for example, the European Commission’s Onlife Initiative [2014]) can 
start and enrich dialogue. However, in cases where there is substantive 
disagreement among parties (that is, where there is no overlapping 
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consensus), public policy ought not to be based on such theories. This 
does not mean that we can make no progress in the pressing issues that 
face us; in many cases, it will be possible to avoid controversial theoreti-
cal debates—for instance, about the nature of information (Floridi, 2005; 
Furner, 2004; Hjørland, 2007)—and find agreement on practical princi-
ples, such as the protection of online privacy. 
Not only can a robust dialogic public reason support a principle of ac-
cess to information, but access to information is a necessary precondition 
for public reason. In order to craft workable and fair principles, persons 
must be able to put forward their views in a public setting, be exposed to 
the views and traditions of others, and have access to essential information. 
Moreover, persons must have the capacities to understand and critically 
evaluate this information. Consider just some of the kinds of opportunities 
people need to share and receive information in order for public reason-
ing to develop and justify political principles. In order to have a fruitful 
discussion about how we can organize our affairs collectively, people need 
access to useful and accurate information about the range of possible social 
practices, along with information about their characteristic benefits and 
problems. The reasoning for the principles should, according to Rawls 
(1993), “include the procedures and conclusions of science and social 
thought where these are well established and not controversial” (p. 67).
Persons do not just need access to the “facts”; people need to be able 
to express their points of view, hear the points of view of others, engage in 
questioning and conversation, and their expressions be given due weight 
in public deliberations. The ability to engage in such a dialogue requires 
more than knowing various facts about others—it requires tolerance, mu-
tual respect, fairness, and civility (Rawls, 1993, p. 122). By treating others 
in this way and being so treated, persons acknowledge themselves and 
others as equal members of the community, supporting what Rawls (1971) 
calls “the social bases of self-respect” (p. 62). Of course, dialogue does not 
end once principles have been adopted; like any virtue, we develop these 
virtues by practicing them, which we can only do in an environment that 
values freedom of expression and diversity. 
Even once an overlapping consensus has developed for political princi-
ples, people will need information about what the principles are and the 
reasoning for them. This is what Rawls (1993) calls the “publicity condi-
tion”—that is, people governed by the principles should know what they 
are and the basic reasoning for them (pp. 66–67). And, as principles are 
not self-implementing, persons will need information about the effective 
means for implementing them. In order to monitor whether the politi-
cal principles are actually effective, persons will need information about 
where and when the principles are not being followed. Furthermore, in 
order for individuals and communities to benefit from the principles, in-
formation must be freely available about both the mechanisms for address-
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ing their violations of the principles and how to use those mechanisms. 
Finally, people need the information required to determine whether the 
principles are really promoting the goods intended, and whether they 
continue to do so as society changes. 
Human Rights as Principles for Global Public Reason
Given that information now flows easily around the globe and the fact 
that many wish to control this flow for better or for worse, a number of 
theorists have focused on developing a global and intercultural informa-
tion ethics (Capurro, 2005, 2008; Carbo & Smith, 2008b; Ess, 2006; Hon-
gladarom & Ess, 2007; Smith, 2001; Zaïane, 2011). Since, as mentioned in 
the introduction, many of the most pressing questions in information eth-
ics are political questions, we should be seeking for a global overlapping 
consensus on shared principles of global information justice. One of the 
few political philosophers who has written on the subject, Joshua Cohen 
(2006), writes that “global public reason comprises a set of political val-
ues, principles, and norms for assessing political societies, both separately 
and in their relations, that can be widely shared” (p. 236). I follow Cohen 
in claiming that human rights, as put forward in a number of documents 
from the United Nations and international bodies, can supply a set of 
possible values, principles, and norms; as such, they can form a common 
language and commitments within which global public debate about is-
sues like privacy, access, and intellectual property can take place. 
Human rights are moral rights (often enshrined in soft or hard law) 
that all persons have, regardless of their nationality, sex, religion, and so 
on. Human rights as articulated in the UN’s 1947 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) can be seen as the object of an overlapping 
consensus expressing a “global public reason” avant la lettre. Indeed, the 
development of the declaration looks much like dialogic public reason 
in action. In the process of developing the list of rights to be adopted by 
the UN, scholars from around the world and from a variety of traditions 
were consulted (including philosophers and religious leaders from places 
as diverse as the United States, Soviet Union, South America, Africa, Chi-
na, Turkey, and Europe). In addition to formal and informal discussions, 
memos, draft documents, and so on, each of these scholars was asked to 
write an essay for a volume that would articulate the range of points of 
view supporting the human rights listed in the declaration. In the intro-
duction to that volume, Jacques Maritain characterized their delibera-
tions in a way similar to Rawls’s characterization of overlapping consensus 
some forty years later. Maritain asked: “How . . . can we imagine an agree-
ment of minds between men who are gathered together precisely in order 
to accomplish a common intellectual task, men who come from the four 
corners of the globe, and who not only belong to different cultures and 
civilizations, but are of antagonistic spiritual associations and schools of 
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thought?” He answered that “agreement between minds can be reached 
spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on com-
mon practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same concep-
tion of the world, of man and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation 
of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action . . . a body of common 
practical convictions” (UNESCO & Maritain, 1949, p. 2).
Taking our cue from Maritain, we can understand human rights as a 
set of practical political principles for organizing our collective life glob-
ally. There is evidence that human rights are already serving as such. Ac-
cording to noted human rights theorist James Nickel (2012), “Human 
rights are more widely accepted than they have ever been. They have be-
come part of the currency of international relations, and most countries 
participate in the human rights system” (§5.8). Individuals in twenty-four 
countries, including Kenya, Azerbaijan, China, Mexico, and South Korea, 
found that “the dominant view was in favor of the United Nations actively 
promoting human rights principles in member states. On average 70 per-
cent favored such efforts” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 1).
Human rights have the virtues of any principle-based approach: the 
rights are public, easy to understand, and not grounded in any particular 
ethical theory or comprehensive conception. In addition, they have the 
virtue of being widely accepted and already embedded in much interna-
tional discourse about just institutions. Indeed, it is increasingly common 
for countries accused of human rights violations to respond, not by re-
jecting the rights, but by challenging the claim that they are “human” 
rights. The leaders of these countries may argue, for instance, that it is a 
question of prioritizing human rights or balancing them with other im-
portant goods, such as security or prosperity; or, they may say that while 
they accept human rights, the particular rights proposed by the UN do 
not reflect genuine human rights or the full range of such rights; or, they 
may respond by pointing out the human rights violations of others. It is 
increasingly rare, however, for those in power to outright reject human 
rights as norms without international validity. 
For example, Chinese officials recently responded to what they called 
the United States’ “carping” about human rights in China by issuing a 
scathing report on the human rights violations in the United States (“Chi-
na Hits Back,” 2013). The report pointed out a number of aspects in which 
the United States is failing to respect such rights, including surveillance of 
citizens and failure to protect citizens from gun violence. While one may 
argue that this is a case of trying to redirect attention, it is notable that the 
Chinese government did not simply say that human rights are a Western 
construct that do not apply to the East; rather, Chinese officials claimed 
that they are respecting human rights and that the United States is distort-
ing the record. This is not to say, of course, that everyone in all countries 
accepts the construct of human rights; some hold to the view that there is 
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a correct comprehensive conception that should determine what laws and 
policies a state should adopt. Nevertheless, increasingly, human rights are 
becoming an ethical “lingua franca” (Tasioulas, 2007). 
To adopt a human rights framework is not to commit ourselves to every 
putative right listed in UN documents. We can take seriously current hu-
man rights agreements as a starting point but leave open the possibility of 
critique. As Cohen (2004) puts it, “global public reason—and the idea of 
human rights in particular—provides a terrain of deliberation and argu-
ment about appropriate norms, . . . not a determinate and settled doc-
trine awaiting acceptance or rejection” (p. 195). Such questioning is a 
natural part of the ongoing project of dialogic public reason. 
While comprehensive conceptions can be provided as reasons in pub-
lic discourse, the ultimate public justification for shared principles like 
human rights should not rely upon controversial comprehensive concep-
tions. Thus, if a putative human right is justified solely in terms of con-
troversial comprehensive conceptions, it does not count as part of global 
public reason. To illustrate how public reason can function as a way to 
evaluate principles, I conclude this section by briefly considering wheth-
er the right to intellectual property satisfies the requirements of public 
reason. 
The UDHR states in article 27, paragraph 2 that “everyone has the 
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”9 
For the sake of simplicity, we can call this “the human right to intellectual 
property.” In its various documents, the UN has offered a set of justifica-
tions for this right. According to the UN, the “material interests” of cre-
ators refers to the potential income from the sale of a creative work suf-
ficient to enjoy an adequate standard of living (UNHRC, General Com-
ment 17, §15).10 But, it is not obvious why persons have a right to make a 
living off of their intellectual works. In many cultures, intellectual works 
are seen as belonging to the community as a whole (Mathiesen, 2012; 
Mun, 2008). The most common justification offered for the right to own 
intellectual property is based on the theories of Locke (Hughes, 1988; 
Moore, 1997). On the Lockean justification, we have a natural right to 
our intellectual property on parallel reasoning with our natural right to 
physical property. Since, according to Locke, we own our bodies (includ-
ing our minds), we come to own those things that we transform using our 
bodies. In creating intellectual works, we work on and transform the com-
mon cultural resources to create something new, thereby gaining owner-
ship over these creations. The “moral interests” of creators include the 
rights to be recognized as the author of a work and to reject any distortion 
of the work that would “be prejudicial to the honour or reputation” of the 
author (UNHRC, General Comment 17, §13); the UN justifies this right 
by appealing to the view that works are “expressions of the personality of 
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their creator” (§14). A locus classicus of this idea is Hegel’s (1820/1991) 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, according to which the things we cre-
ate are the physical manifestations of our personalities in the world; they 
have an intrinsic and unalienable connection to us as persons (Hughes, 
1988, p. 350). Both the Lockean and Hegelian views of the relationship 
between persons and their creations are highly culturally specific; a num-
ber of cultural traditions do not conceptualize creative works as the sole 
production and property of individuals in this way.
As can be seen from the above, the current justifications provided 
by the UN for intellectual property as a human right are deficient from 
the perspective of public reason, as they rely upon “comprehensive con-
ceptions.” The UN offers no alternative comprehensive conceptions to 
support the human rights of authors in their works, nor does it appeal 
to widely shared reasons. Thus, as they stand, these justifications do not 
follow Maritain’s call for practical principles grounded in shared expe-
rience, and they fail the test of public reason. Absent an alternative or 
more pluralistic justification of the human right to intellectual property, 
we should be skeptical of its status as a human right. As a result, we should 
give less weight to considerations of intellectual property rights than to 
other rights that are more securely grounded in public reason, such as the 
human right to have access to information (Mathiesen, 2013). 
Conclusion
Many of the most pressing issues in information ethics—informational pri-
vacy, surveillance, intellectual property, access to information, the distri-
bution of information resources—are ones that must be addressed at the 
level of global politics. In addressing these issues, information ethicists do 
not need to reinvent the wheel; there is a rich vein of reflection on how to 
think about political principles in a pluralistic, multicultural context. The 
work of Rawls, Habermas, Cohen, and many others can provide helpful 
concepts and frameworks for thinking through issues in global informa-
tion ethics. It is not only information ethics that can benefit from greater 
contact with political philosophy, however; political philosophers have as 
yet not sufficiently engaged with questions of informational justice. These 
questions are becoming increasingly central to human freedom and well-
being as we all become part of a global information society. In addition 
to broadening the scope of their questions, however, a focus on informa-
tional justice has even more to offer to those working in basic questions in 
political philosophy. Attention to the role of information brings into fo-
cus the fact that, in order for public reason to function and for systems to 
achieve justice, certain informational conditions, such as open access to 
information and information privacy, must be met. Information ethicists 
have an important contribution to make in articulating the centrality of 
information to the project of political philosophy. 
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Notes
 1. This actually encompasses the broader category of social and political philosophy. For 
the sake of simplicity, I will just use the umbrella term political philosophy.
 2. One notable exception is the work of Joren van den Hoven (see, for example, van den 
Hoven & Rooksby, 2008).
 3. Nonphilosophers often make a distinction between morals and ethics. But within philoso-
phy, these terms are typically used interchangeably. It is more common to use ethics in 
discussions of applied or practical ethics, but this does not track any substantive distinction 
between the notions of morals and ethics as they are used in philosophical discourse. 
 4. Admittedly, at various times philosophers have considered some human beings—for 
example, women, slaves, and certain ethnic and racial groups—as lesser moral agents, 
having some moral responsibility though to a lesser degree. (Today, most theorists, al-
though not all, place children in this category.)
 5. While it is a subfield of ethics, it is not typically called political ethics, but political philosophy. 
This may be because the term ethics has a connotation of something based on day-to-day 
interactions and less on wide-scale social organization.
 6. In addition to political questions about the creation, collection, and distribution of infor-
mation, there are more fundamental issues about the role of information in an account 
of political and social justice. I will return to a discussion of the foundational role of 
information in political philosophy at the end of section 3.
 7. Even these distinctions can get blurry, however. One may take a consequentializing ap-
proach to protecting rights, or one may justify duties or rights on the grounds that acting 
on them will lead to the best consequences. Conversely, nonconsequentialists may give 
significant moral weight to whether something produces good consequences, giving 
priority to rights and duties.
 8. This is not to say that we can expect to find principles to which all persons will agree or 
that all comprehensive conceptions are capable of grounding an overlapping consensus. 
According to Rawls, it is not to be expected that “unreasonable” conceptions will form 
a part of the consensus. Reasonable persons (or persons with reasonable conceptions) 
are those who recognize the fact of pluralism and who wish to operate on principles that 
are fair to all parties.
 9 Interestingly, unlike the right to own property, which is also listed in the UDHR. The right 
to the protection of intellectual property rights is included in a binding international 
covenant, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
10. The UN periodically issues statements (called “General Comments”) on various human 
rights listed in its documents in order to provide guidance and insight into those rights.
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